Abstract: This study analyzes the determinants of changes in corporate ownership and firm failure, taking into account different types of sellers and buyers of control blocks. For a large panel of German companies we find that firms are more likely to fail or to be sold when performance is poor, financial pressure is high, and firm size is small. Pyramids and cross-ownership deter control changes. Ownership concentration has a nonlinear impact on the likelihood of control transfer. In contrast to corporate shareholders, private shareholders tend to sell control blocks of firms under financial pressure.
Introduction
Dynamics in firm ownership are beginning to form a new fragment in the complex corporate governance framework. Transfers of corporate control occur more frequently than often assumed. For the US, Barley and Holderness (1991) report that during the years 1978-1982 the number of registered block trades was about twice as high as the number of tender offers. Bethel et al. (1998) document that firms on the Fortune 500 list are three times as likely to experience a block acquisition by an activist investor than a hostile takeover or leveraged buyout. In Germany and in other Continental European countries, hostile takeovers are rare (Franks and Mayer, 1998) , but block trades are comparable in frequency to the US (see Franks and Mayer, 1994, and Köke, 2000 , for Germany; see Renneboog, 2000, for Belgium) .
Along with evidence on the frequency of changes in corporate control, evidence is accumulating on the causes of control transfers. Poor performance (Denis and Sarin, 1999; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2000) , high financial pressure (Zingales, 1998) , or economic shocks (Denis and Sarin, 1999) are identified as factors that make control transfers more likely. In turn, not adapting governance structures can make firm failure more likely (Kole and Lehn, 1999) . In contrast, evidence on the transaction itself, in particular the trading partners of control blocks, is sparse. Previous studies limit their attention to changes in managerial ownership and the associated consequences for a firm (Kole and Lehn, 1999; Denis and Sarin, 1999) , or the effects of block purchases by activist, financial, and strategic shareholders (Bethel et al., 1998) . To our knowledge, there is no study that analyzes simultaneously which type of shareholder is more likely to buy or to sell control blocks, and whether firm-specific characteristics influence the likelihood of selling or buying a firm differently, depending on the type of owner.
This study aims to provide a better understanding of the determinants of firm failure and control transfers, in particular the role of the type of controlling shareholders. The analysis is based on a sample of over 1,300 large and medium-sized German companies for the years 1986-1995. We find that, irrespective of the type of controlling shareholder, firms are both more likely to fail and to experience a change in ownership when performance is poor, financial pressure is high, and firm size is small. In contrast, complex ownership structures such as pyramids and cross-ownership reduce the likelihood of failure and control transfer. Concerning the type of seller, we find that the likelihood for an acquisition of a firm without a dominant shareholder increases with share concentration for low levels of concentration. In contrast, it decreases with share concentration for firms under tight control of one large blockholder. In combination, this suggests that firms with medium share concentration are most likely to be acquired. In addition, firms under control of a private shareholder are more likely to sell firms when financial pressure increases, but firms under control of a corporate shareholder are not. Regarding the buyers of control blocks, larger firms are most likely to be sold to the government or to the public, but the least likely to a private shareholder.
This study proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a short overview to the theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of firm failure and control changes as well as the role of different types of buyers and sellers in control transactions. The literature is condensed into a set of hypotheses which are tested in the empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the data used in this study, the frequency of failure and control changes, and gives some preliminary evidence on the causes of failure and changes in control based on descriptive statistics. Section 4 briefly discusses some methodological issues related to the multinomial regression approach applied and presents the regression results on the determinants of corporate control changes and failure. Section 5 concludes.
Literature and resulting hypotheses
To structure our empirical analysis of dynamics in corporate ownership and firm survival, we formulate a set of hypotheses building on the existing theoretical and empirical literature. This section follows a three-step approach. First, we review predictions concerning the determinants of changes in ownership and firm survival. In a second step, we consider predictions concerning which type of investor is likely to buy a company. And in a third step, we focus on predictions concerning which type of investor is more likely to sell a company. Each of the three following subsections concludes with a set of hypotheses.
Control transfers and firm failure
The current theoretical view of control transfers is largely shaped by two conflicting effects of blockholder control (Bebchuk, 1993; Kahan, 1994) . On the one hand, transferring control to a more effective management team could improve efficiency. On the other hand, the acquirer's primary motive may be to loot the firm to the detriment of small shareholders. Empirical evidence suggests that block trades lead to efficiency gains (Barley and Holderness, 1991) . However, Burkart et al. (2000) argue that the evidence on block transfers is neither sufficient to prove that firm value is maximized nor that the block trade is the best feasible outcome. In their model the incumbent and new controlling shareholder prefer to trade the block, failing to internalize negative externalities for small shareholders resulting from private benefits accruing to the blockholder.
Nevertheless, evidence on the aftermath of block purchases suggests that, by and large, they bring about improvements. For the US, Bethel et al. (1998) report that activist block purchases are followed by significant operational changes, increased CEO turnover, and improvements in profitability. For the UK, Franks et al. (1999) document increased board turnover in poorly performing firms after a block purchase. For Germany, Köke (2000) finds that control transfers are followed by increased managerial turnover as well as improvements in profitability and productivity of poorly performing firms. Denis and Sarin (1999) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2000) provide empirical evidence for the US that firms with poor performance are more likely to be takeover targets. In sum, we expect that changes in corporate control are more likely when efficiency gains can be realized.
can alter the allocation of resources within the firm. In turn, changes in the firm's growth opportunities, leverage, or firm size could make adjustments in ownership necessary. Consistent with this view, Zingales (1998) reports that following deregulation in the US trucking industry in 1977 firms were confronted with increasing leverage, and that this has lead to a higher probability of market exit. Other empirical studies on firm failure confirm this role of financial pressure (Altman, 1968; Powell, 1997) . Hence, we expect that firms with high financial pressure are more likely to be takeover targets or candidates for failure.
Hypothesis C2: Control transfers and failure are more likely for firms with high financial pressure. And the effect of high financial pressure is likely to be more pronounced for failure than for control transfers.
The concentration of share ownership could also affect the likelihood of firm failure or control transfer. Grossman and Hart (1980) argue that a precondition for hostile takeovers to be effective is concentrated share ownership because under a dispersed ownership structure shareholders would prefer to free-ride. In consequence, no takeover would take place in widely-held firms. Burkart et al. (2000) show that the incumbent and new controlling shareholder prefer to trade the block rather than sell shares to the public and, in a second step, accumulate those dispersed shares because they anticipate the free-riding behavior of small shareholders in tender offers. Hence, an ex ante larger concentration of shares should make control transfers more likely. In contrast, Holmström and Tirole (1993) argue that takeovers require low concentration of ownership and, in turn, high market liquidity because only then are capital markets able to determine the necessity of a takeover. The few cases of hostile takeovers in Germany support Holmström and Tirole: In all cases the shares of the takeover target were widely dispersed (Franks and Mayer, 1998) . However, the significant number of non-hostile control transfers in Germany indicates that block trades occur also in the presence of a large share concentration, which is typical for German companies (Köke, 2000; Ljungqvist and Jenkinson, 2001 ). In sum, we expect the costs of a takeover to be the largest for both very high and very low concentration of share ownership.
The implication of share concentration for firm failure is less ambiguous. Higher share concentration implies that the scope for agency conflicts is reduced, and hence large shareholders can alleviate the agency problem via better monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986 ). In turn, we expect that the likelihood of failure is reduced with ownership concentration.
Hypothesis C3: Control transfers are less likely for firms with very high and very low concentration of ownership, and failure is less likely for firms with high ownership concentration.
But also other characteristics of a firm's ownership structure can be relevant. If a firm is part of a pyramid structure, management could be more likely to resist control sales because selling parts of a conglomerate would imply a loss of organizational capital. Likewise, pyramids can manifest managerial empires and as such have a value to managers (Franks and Mayer, 1995) . We expect that changes in ownership are less likely when the respective firm is part of a pyramid. Similarly, changes in ownership should be less likely if a firm is ultimately controlled by the well-known web of German firms (Adams, 1994; Wenger and Kaserer, 1997) . The reason is that cross-ownership of firms potentially provi-des target management with an effective anti-takeover device against unwelcome raiders (Bebchuk et al., 1998) .
Likewise, we expect failures to be less likely for firms which are part of pyramids or are controlled by cross-owned shareholders. The reason is that complex ownership structures, as represented by pyramids and cross-ownership, could reduce informational asymmetries. Likewise, empire-building could prevent management from closing down firms even in mature industries (Jensen, 1986) .
Hypothesis C4: Control transfers and failure are less likely for firms which are part of a pyramid. The effect of pyramid structures is likely to be more pronounced for failure than for control transfers.
Hypothesis C5: Control transfers and failure are less likely for firms which are controlled by cross-owned shareholders. The effect of cross-ownership is likely to be more pronounced for failure than for control transfers.
Finally, firm size could deter failure or changes in control. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that the market for corporate control is less liquid as size increases. Another reason might be that the likelihood of a friendly or hostile takeover will be lower for large firms due to wealth constraints on the side of the buyer. Bethel et al. (1998) and Mulherin and Boone (2000) provide empirical evidence that smaller firms are more likely than larger firms to become takeover targets. Concerning firm failure, bankruptcy should be less likely for very large firms. If very large firms get into financial trouble, this might give management the opportunity to be eligible for help from outside creditors or the government. A recent example is the case of the construction conglomerate Holzmann AG. After having come into severe financial difficulties in the year 2000, creditors agreed -under the lead of German chancellor Schröder -to extend existing credits to Holzmann by another 2 billion DM.
Hypothesis C6: Control transfers and failure are less likely for large firms.
Control transfers: the type of sellers
If performance is poor, we expect that firms owned by a private shareholder are less likely to be sold than firms owned by a corporate shareholder. One reason is that private shareholders are often deeply involved in the respective firm besides their monetary investment. In case of Germany, large private blockholders are typically members of the founding family. Hence, performance is unlikely to provide an impetus for selling as strong as for corporate shareholders. In contrast, we expect that poorly performing firms which do not have a dominant shareholder are even more likely to be sold to a private or corporate shareholder. The reason is that a strong shareholder should be able to fix governance problems. In addition, an acquisition should be more likely if the shares are previously dispersed, as argued above (Holmström and Tirole, 1993) .
Hypothesis S1: A poorly performing is less likely to be sold when owned by a private shareholder than when owned by a corporate shareholder, but most likely when no dominant shareholder exists.
If a firm faces high financial pressure, for example a large burden of debt or low liquidity, we expect private shareholders to be most likely to sell, but firms without dominant shareholders the least likely. In analogy to our arguments above, firms with a dispersed shareholder base should be able to address liquidity problems, for example by issuing further shares to the public. Corporate shareholders often command over internal capital markets that can be used to transfer cash flow between divisions. Lamont (1997) shows that this is the case for the US oil industry. Private shareholders, in contrast, are likely to be the most wealth-constrained.
Hypothesis S2: A firm facing high financial pressure is less likely to be sold when owned by a corporate shareholder than when owned by a private shareholder, but the least likely when no dominant shareholder exists.
Control transfers: the type of buyers
Empirical evidence suggests that block purchases can induce performance improvements in poorly performing firms (Denis and Sarin, 1999; Köke 2000) . Barley and Holderness (1991) show that stock prices react positively to a change in the identity of the blockholder. However, we would argue that efficiency gains also depend on the type of the buyer of the control block. If performance is poor, a company should be more likely to be bought by an investor that is able to turn around the firm. We expect that such efficiency gains are more likely when the bidder has a superior monitoring technology, for example knowledge of the respective industry, knowledge how to detect potential deficiencies in an inefficiently governed takeover target, and knowledge how to conduct corporate restructuring. Since these kinds of knowledge typically are acquired only in business practice, we expect financial firms (such as banks) and non-financial firms to be the most able to realize any efficiency gains. In turn, individuals should be more knowledge-constrained.
Likewise, poorly performing firms should be less likely to sell previously concentrated shares to several large or many small investors (henceforth: the public) because this would create the well-known free-rider problem (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) . Hence, bringing the organization back on track would be even more difficult without a strong controlling shareholder.
Hypothesis B1: If a poorly performing firm is sold, then it is most likely to be sold to a corporate shareholder, less likely to a private shareholder, and the least likely to the public.
Similarly, if a firm's debt burden is high or its liquidity low, a corporate shareholder should be more likely to buy this firm than a private shareholder. The reason is that private shareholders are typically more wealth-constrained than corporate shareholders. However, in case of poor liquidity selling shares to the public should be an even better solution than selling to another firm, in particular in the wake of major investment programs (Pagano and Röell, 1996) .
Hypothesis B2: If a firm with a large burden of debt or low liquidity is sold, then it is most likely to be sold to the public, less likely to a corporate shareholder, and the least likely to a private shareholder.
Finally, as firm size can reduce the likelihood of acquisition (Bethel et al., 1998; Mulherin and Boone, 2000) , firm size should matter even more when a private shareholder, but also a corporate shareholder considers an acquisition.
Hypothesis B3:
If a large firm is sold, then it is most likely to be sold to the public, less likely to a corporate shareholder, and the least likely to a private shareholder.
Data description
The sample comprises 6,926 observations on 1,351 firms over the years [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] . For all firms the data set contains yearly information on firm performance, capital structure, ownership structure, and firm size. The panel is unbalanced in the sense that firms can enter the sample after the year 1986 and exit the sample before 1995.
A crucial element of our data set is detailed information on the firms' ownership structure. Ownership information is available for the years 1986-1996. Applying a concept of control, which is based on ultimate share ownership (Köke, 2000; see Appendix B), we identify whether a firm in any given year has a dominant controlling shareholder or not, and of which type this controlling shareholder is. In a second step, based on changes in the name of the so-defined ultimate owner we determine whether a change in control takes place. For the cases in which balance sheet data time series end before 1996, the last year for which ownership information is available, we evaluate whether this lack of balance sheet data is due to an acquisition or bankruptcy in the year ahead. In sum, we obtain information on the survival status (transfer of control, no transfer of control, or failure) of all sample firms. Since the last year for which the survival status can be calculated is 1996, and since the present analysis focuses on the year prior to a change in control or failure, the sample used for the analysis covers the years 1986-1995. In the data set, there are five types of ultimate shareholders: private, financial firms, non-financial firms, government authorities, and no single dominant shareholder (dispersed shares). Due to a limited number of cases we aggregate financial and non-financial shareholders as corporate shareholders. Appendix A contains a detailed description of the data sources used and the procedure applied to construct our sample. Appendix B gives a technical description of the concept of control used to identify the ultimate owner of each sample firm. Appendix D summarizes the definition of all variables analyzed in this study.
The following Section 3.1 describes the frequency of changes in ownership and the frequency of different types of shareholders acting as buyer or seller of sample firms. Section 3.2 provides preliminary evidence on the determinants of control transfers and failure based on simple descriptive statistics. Table 1 shows that in the largest number of cases (91.9 percent of firm-years) neither a transfer of control nor firm failure occurs. For 38 firms (0.5 percent of firm-years) we observe failure due to bankruptcy or voluntary liquidation. And a change in control occurs in 576 cases (7.6 percent of firm-years). When a change in control takes place, mostly a corporate shareholder is the new owner of the firm. A firm is less likely to be acquired by one private shareholder, and even less likely to be bought from a few large or many small shareholders. However, a firm is the least likely to be sold to the government. Notes: For the definition of shareholder types see Appendix D. The rows have the following relations: (1) = (2) + (3) + (5); (6) 
Frequency of control transfers and failure
What is also evident from Table 1 is that the largest fraction of sample firms is ultimately owned by a corporate shareholder (50.2 percent), a smaller fraction by private a shareholder (33.2 percent) and by the government (5.3 percent), and for 11.3 percent of all firm-years there is no single dominant shareholder. As mentioned above, firms classified as 'dispersed' are owned either by a small number of similarly large shareholders or by a large number of very small shareholders.
Overall, changes in ultimate ownership affect a significant number of sample firms. Out of 1,510 firms 1,079 (71.5 percent) do not experience any change in control during the 1986-1996 period. Vice versa, more than one quarter of all firms included in the sample experiences at least one change in ownership during the sample period. In about 21 percent of all firms the ultimate owner changes once, in about six percent twice, and in about one percent three or four times. But overall, several consecutive changes in control are not very likely. Table 2 provides first evidence on the determinants of firm failure and transfers of control. It reports mean (columns 1-3) and median (columns 4-6) values of the variables that have been identified in Section 2 as potentially important determinants of changes in control and failure. These statistics are used to compare firms that experience a major change in ownership or failure in the year ahead with firms that survive and do not experience a major change in ownership. Table 2 shows that firms which fail or experience a change in control perform significantly worse compared with surviving firms without a change in control. In addition, performance of failing firms, measured as industry-adjusted return-on-assets, is worse than performance of acquired firms. This difference is significant at the one-percent level. An analogous relationship is found for financial pressure. The burden of debt, measured by the debt-to-assets ratio, is significantly larger for firms which fail or experience a change in control, compared with surviving firms without any major change in ownership. In turn, financial pressure is larger for failing firms than for firms which are acquired (significant at the one-percent level).
Descriptive evidence
Firm size provides another clear distinction between failing, surviving, and acquired firms. Firms that go bankrupt have, on average, total assets of about 660 million DM, and firms that are acquired total assets of, on average, 960 million DM. This is significantly less than total assets of surviving firms which amount to over 1,700 million DM. Similar differences are found for total sales and the number of employees as measures of firm size (not reported). Hence, firm size appears to reduce the likelihood of both failure and change in ownership.
Furthermore, ownership is significantly more concentrated in firms which survive and do not experience a change in control, compared with failing firms and firms experiencing a transfer of control. For firms with a change in ownership, this result holds irrespective whether share concentration is measured by the Herfindahl index, the size of the largest block, or a dummy variable indicating whether the respective firm has a dominant shareholder or not. However, failing and acquired firms are not significantly different in terms of share concentration. Furthermore, Table 2 indicates that firms which are part of a pyramid or are controlled by a cross-owned shareholder are significantly less likely to fail. In fact, none of the firms that declare bankruptcy are controlled by a shareholder that is part of the web of large German financial and non-financial conglomerates. In addition, the level of control, our measure of the height of the pyramid through which a firm is controlled, is significantly lower for firms that fail, compared with firms that survive and both, do or do not experience a change in control. In combination, the results on ownership structure suggest that complex ownership structures as reflected in large pyramids and cross-ownership appear to reduce the likelihood of firm failure, but not the likelihood of control transfers.
Empirical models for control transfers and failure
The descriptive evidence discussed in Section 3.2 provides a first indication of the determinants of control transfers and firm failure. However, this evidence is only preliminary because the reported effects are not calculated under ceteris paribus conditions. Therefore we now analyze the issues related to transfers of corporate control and firm failure in an econometric framework, which controls for the fact that different variables can simultaneously affect the probability of acquisition or failure.
First, we briefly discuss our econometric approach (Section 4.1). Then we present estimation results for three different models. In Section 4.2 we investigate the effect of firm characteristics on the probabilities of a change of the dominant shareholder and of failure, for the moment ignoring the type of seller and buyer in control transactions. In Section 4.3 we extend our model by allowing different impacts of the explanatory variables, depending on the type of shareholder that currently controls the firm. Section 4.4 presents results of a model in which we distinguish between the different types buyers of control blocks. Finally, Section 4.5 discusses the sensitivity of our results to different choices of explanatory variables and different sample selection.
Econometric Approach
As argued in Section 2, economic theory suggests that certain characteristics of a firm have an impact on the probability of a transition of control and firm failure. We specify a discrete choice model with these two outcomes, with the outcome of no change as the reference alternative. As explanatory variables, we use one-year-lagged values of measures of performance, financial pressure, firm size and ownership structure described in the previous section. For the definition of all variables employed see Appendix D. We choose these variables after numerous tests of different combinations of variables. For robustness checks, see Section 4.5.
By specifying a discrete choice model, the outcome probabilities can be parameterized to identify their determinants and the ceteris paribus effects of the explanatory variables. For each of the sets of outcomes and interactions presented in the next three sections, we estimate two different well-known parameterizations. A popular discrete choice model is the multinomial logit (MNL) model. It is widely used in empirical studies because its globally concave likelihood function makes estimation straightforward.
1
The computational simplicity of the MNL model comes at costs. It has the disadvantage of imposing strong restrictions on the substitution pattern between outcomes. A wellknown effect of the model structure is the independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property that is also known as the red bus-blue bus problem. If some alternatives are closer substitutes to each other than others, this assumption is violated and the estimates are biased. An econometric model that allows the researcher to specify candidates of groups of similar alternatives is the nested multinomial logit model (NMNL). In contrast to the simple MNL model, it allows for correlations of the unobserved characteristics. While more involved than the MNL, the full information maximum likelihood estimation of a NMNL model is still feasible. For a discussion of the IIA problem and the NMNL model, see Train (1986, ch.4) .
Potentially similar alternatives are collected in subsets called "nests". A parameter for each nest, which is often called "dissimilarity parameter", represents the closeness of substitution between the alternatives. It is estimated jointly with the other model parameters. The MNL model can be viewed as a special case of the NMNL model that restricts all dissimilarity parameters to unity. Therefore, a simple parameter test of the estimated dissimilarity parameters in a NMNL model can be used to test the hypothesis that the MNL model is appropriate. Another test that builds on the IIA property of the MNL model and does not require the estimation of the more complicated NMNL model is suggested by Hausman and McFadden (1984) . We present results of both econometric models and test them against each other. Of course, even more flexible discrete choice models have been developed. Panel probit or mixed logit models can, for example, capture correlations of unobserved firm characteristics over time. However, we would argue that the NMNL model is flexible enough to capture the most important effects in our framework.
A more serious problem of our approach may be the endogeneity of some of our regressors, especially performance. Since we use lagged values of our explanatory variables, the potential sources of endogeneity are not changes after or during takeovers. Unlike the approach of other studies (see, e.g., Brickley et al., 1988 ) that regress performance on ownership types, our analysis does not suffer from a direct link between ownership types and performance either. However, if the market for corporate control really works as an instrument to discipline bad management (Jensen, 1988) , the threat of a takeover should increase firm performance. This creates a positive causal relationship from takeover probabilities to firm performance. This effect may lead to coefficient estimates that do not represent the causal effect of performance on takeover probabilities. However, as this discussion shows, one would expect the estimates to be biased downwards in absolute value by this endogeneity. Our estimates of the coefficients for performance can therefore be interpreted as a lower bound for the causal effect on the takeover probability. Of course, it would be interesting to extend our analysis and simultaneously model takeover probabilities and other variables such as firm performance. But this is beyond the scope of this paper and will be left for future research.
Determinants of control transfers and firm failure
In a first step, we examine the impact of firm performance, financial pressure, and other firm-specific characteristics on ownership change and failure. That is, for the moment we ignore the different types of shareholders. In this model, there are three possible outcomes: no change, change of dominant shareholder, and failure. A change of the dominant shareholder may be a similar event to a failure. We therefore estimate both an MNL and an NMNL model, with the change and failure outcomes sharing a nest.
Both a Wald test on the dissimilarity parameter being unity and a Likelihood ratio test reject the hypothesis that the MNL model is appropriate at the ten-percent significance level. Therefore, we report the results from both models ( Table 3) . The results hardly differ qualitatively. As the reference outcome relative to which the coefficients have to interpreted, we choose the outcome no change because this outcome is the most populated. For example, column (1) of Table 3 shows the parameter estimates for the outcome change. A positive coefficient means that a high value of the respective variable increases the probability of a change in control. Since the results do not differ much, the NMNL model is specified slightly differently. Here, the reference outcome is change. We can therefore directly identify whether the parameters of change and failure are significantly different.
Turning to the results shown in Table 3 we find a significantly negative impact of industry-adjusted return-on-assets (ROA), our measure of performance, on the likelihood of both, acquisition and failure. Hence, a test of the null hypothesis that Hypothesis C1 is incorrect is statistically rejected by the MNL model. Poor performance appears to make a change in control as well as firm failure more likely. The NMNL model is not as clear. With an asymptotic t-statistic of 1.63, the coefficient for the change outcome is not significant. However, the effect of performance on failure is significantly more pronounced than its effect on change. In general, our finding on the effect of performance for acquisition and failure is consistent with evidence on the US (Powell, 1997; Denis and Sarin, 1999; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2000; Astebro and Winter, 2001 ). The results in Table 3 also support Hypothesis C2. Firms with high financial pressure, here reflected in a high debt-to-assets ratio, have a larger probability to experience a change in control, and an even larger probability to fail.
Hypothesis C3 predicts a nonlinear impact of ownership concentration on the trade of control blocks. We find empirical evidence for this non-linear relationship. The parameters of the polynomial of the Herfindahl index included in our estimation are significant for the change outcome for both econometric models. Its derivative, the marginal effect of ownership concentration on the probability of change, is negative over the support of the Herfindahl index which is, by definition of the Herfindahl index, bounded between zero and one. This result supports Holmström and Tirole (1993) who argue that the impact of ownership concentration on the probability of a takeover should be negative. Concerning the probability of failure, the results from Table 3 indicate a negative impact of ownership concentration over concentration levels which are relevant for most German firms (Köke, 2001) . However, this effect is statistically insignificant.
Firms that are part of a pyramid or controlled by a cross-owned shareholder are less likely to experience a change in control, as Hypotheses C4 and C5 predict, but this effect is not or only weakly significant. However, we find that the higher the level in a pyramid at which the ultimate shareholder is located, the higher the probability for a transfer of control. One interpretation of this effect could be that due to informational asymmetries monitoring becomes more difficult the higher a pyramid is, potentially implying greater organizational inefficiency. This would explain why pyramids should sell firms which operate on their (organizational) periphery. Concerning failure, no effect of pyramids on the failure probability can be identified. Since no firm with cross-owned shareholders failed in our sample, there is a large negative coefficient for failure, but no significance level can be assigned. Finally, Hypothesis C6 is strongly supported. Taking the natural logarithm of total assets as a measure of firm size, a change in control as well as failure is less likely to occur in large firms. This confirms that firm size works as a kind of takeover deterrent (Bethel et al., 1998; Mulherin and Boone, 2000) , but also as a shelter against failure.
The type of seller in control transfers
As argued in Section 2.2, the outcome probabilities may c.p. differ, depending on the type of the controlling shareholder. For example, due to wealth constraints especially private investors should be less able to provide extra capital to a firm which is temporarily under financial pressure. Therefore we expect the parameter associated with the impact of financial pressure on the change probability to be larger when the firm is owned by a private investor, compared with a firm that is owned by a corporate shareholder. In addition, controlling for types of blockholders is also important from the methodological point of view. If the outcome probabilities differ by blockholder type, ignoring these effects leads to biased parameter estimates unless the explanatory variables do not systematically differ across shareholder types. This can be seen as a classical omitted variables problem.
We therefore extend our previously discussed model by allowing the outcome probabilities to vary by blockholder type. That is, each explanatory variable is fully interacted with dummy variables for each of the following shareholder types: private, corporate, government, and dispersed (see Section 3.1). In this way we allow for and can test the hypotheses formulated in Section 2.2. Again, we estimate a simple MNL and an NMNL model to allow for potential similarities between the change and exit outcomes. Unlike the constrained model above, the estimates do not reject the MNL model. Both models result in basically the same parameter estimates and likelihood values. Obviously, the extra parameters explain the similarities evident in the constrained model. We therefore present only the results of the more efficient MNL model (Table 4) and report the NMNL results in Appendix E (Table 9) .
Column (5) of Table 4 shows the parameter estimates for failure relative to no change. Since these estimates do not differ substantially from those of the previous estimation Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. Constants are included but not reported. **, *, +: significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, 10-% level, respectively.
(Column (2) of Table 3 ), we do not comment on them here. Column (1) presents the parameter estimates for change relative to no change, but only for firms previously controlled by corporate shareholders. For the other three control states, estimates of additional effects are presented in columns (2) to (4). For example, the parameter estimates for a firm controlled by a private shareholder are the sum of the coefficients in column (1) and (3). The test of a zero additional effect is therefore a test on whether the corresponding variable has an impact on the change probability that differs from the effect were the respective firm controlled by a corporate shareholder.
Turning to the results, we find that the impact of performance on the probability of a control transfer is negative for firms under control of a corporate shareholder. However, this effect is statistically the same for all types of controlling shareholders, here reflected in the insignificant coefficients of dispersed, private, and governmental shareholders in columns (2)-(4) of Table 4 . Hence, we do not find empirical support for Hypothesis S1 that shareholders differ in their reaction to poor performance regarding the sale of a firm. However, we find support for Hypothesis S2 that shareholders react differently to financial pressure. Column (1) of Table 4 shows that the effect of financial pressure is statistically zero for firms under control of a corporate shareholder. This is consistent with the notion that corporate shareholders have access to internal capital markets which can be used for cash flow transfers within conglomerates (Lamont, 1997). In contrast, firms appear to be more likely to be sold when being under control of a private shareholder. This supports the notion of liquidity constraints which particularly hit private investors. In turn, firms with a dispersed ownership structure are not statistically different from corporate shareholders in their reaction to financial pressure.
A closer look at the estimated effects of ownership concentration provides some interesting insights. Hypothesis C3 predicts a non-linear impact of ownership concentration on trades of control blocks, or more precisely, a positive impact for low concentration and a negative impact for high concentration. Figure 1 helps to interpret the estimated polynomial. For different shareholder types (dispersed, private, corporate) it shows the predicted probability that a firm will experience a change in control, given its actual characteristics for different hypothetical values of the Herfindahl index, our measure of share concentration. Figure 1 shows these probabilities, averaged over all firms observed for the three types of controlling shareholders. The lines are drawn for the values of the Herfindahl index between the 10 th and the 90 th percentile of the firms in these groups.
There are two major results that can be learned from Figure 1 . First, the effect of ownership concentration is sizable. Compared with a firm with a fully dispersed ownership structure (Herfindahl is approximately zero), a firm with four equally large shareholders (Herfindahl index is 0.25) is almost twice as likely to experience a change in ownership. Second, the estimated shape of the curve for dispersed ownership differs from those for firms under tight control. While the former has the shape as predicted in Hypothesis C3, the latter ones have a negative slope for all values of the Herfindahl index, and the second order term leads to a minimum probability roughly at maximum concentration (Herfindahl index is one). This finding has two interpretations. Either the slopes are in fact identical for all firms and the second-order polynomial does not fit well. Or ownership concentration indeed has different impacts on these two groups of firms. We would argue that different effects of ownership concentration depending on the tightness of control are not unreasonable. The positive impact predicted for very low concentration and observed for dispersed shares can be due to the free-riding behavior of very small shareholders that may prevent takeovers (Grossman and Hart, 1980) . As concentration increases, but firms remain under the influence of several large minority shareholders, the agency problem persists since management is not subject to tight control of one dominant shareholder. But at the same time it should become more easy for a potential buyer to acquire two or more blocks since the costs of a sale should shrink, for example because it becomes less costly to contact all blockholders. In contrast, for firms which are already under control of one large shareholder this problem might not exist because it is enough for the buyer to make a deal with the single blockholder (Burkart et al., 2000) . The only effect that remains is the negative impact of concentration due to lower market liquidity, as argued by Holmström and Tirole (1993) .
The type of buyer in control transfers
As outlined in Section 2.3, the type of the buyer could also play an important role in control transactions. To address this issue we split the outcome change of the control status into the four outcomes transition to dispersed ownership, transition to private shareholder, transition to corporate shareholder, and transition to government. This model can be used to test whether the impact of particular variables on the probability of a change in control differs for different types of potential buyers. In a first step we specify a model in which we explain the now six outcomes (no change, failure, and the four outcomes on change, depending on the type of buyer) by imposing the restriction that the parameters are equal across the four shareholder types. Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. Constants are included but not reported. **, *, +: significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, 10-% level, respectively.
As a natural specification for a NMNL model, the four change outcomes can be nested together. The resulting outcome structure is shown in Figure 2 . The MNL model is strongly rejected against this specification, so we only present the NMNL results which are shown in Table 5 . Columns (1) and (5) contain the estimated coefficients for the probability of a sale to a corporate shareholder and for the probability of failure, respectively. In turn, columns (2) to (4) show the coefficients of a sale to dispersed shareholders, to a private shareholder, or to the government, which again measure any additional effect relative to a sale to a corporate shareholder (column (1)).
We find that firms are more likely to experience a sale to a corporate shareholder when performance is poor. This effect is the same across all types of buyers. Looking at the size of the coefficients, Table 5 shows that the absolute value of the (negative net) coefficient is the smallest for private buyers, the largest for the government, with dispersed shareholders somewhere in between. This sequence of buying shareholder types is consistent with Hypothesis B1, but the difference between shareholder types is statistically insignificant. Similarly, firms are more likely to experience a sale to a corporate shareholder, when financial pressure is high. However, the difference between shareholder types is again insignificant. Hence, there is also no evidence supporting Hypothesis B2.
Concerning the role of firm size for acquisition, we find strong evidence supporting Hypothesis B3. Firms are less less likely to be sold to a corporate shareholder when they are large. However, they are the most likely to be sold to the government (difference significant at the five-percent level), to a lesser extent to the public (difference significant at the ten-percent level), and the least likely to be sold to a private shareholder (difference not significant). These results are in line with evidence provided by Bethel et al. (1998) and Mulherin and Boone (2000) that firm size reduces the likelihood of an acquisition. However, Table 5 suggests that this result only holds for control sales to private or to corporate shareholders, but not for sales to the public or the government. In sum, this effect of firm size for different categories of buyers indicates that the government is not subject to liquidity constraints when considering acquisitions.
As a check of robustness, we also estimated a model which includes different types of buyers and different types of sellers simultaneously. Results are reported in Table 10 in Appendix E. Since the results obtained do not differ qualitatively from the results reported in Tables 4 and 5 , we do not discuss them further. The following Section 4.5 contains more checks of the robustness of our estimation results.
Sensitivity of results
To check whether our results are sensitive to the chosen measures of performance and financial pressure, we perform a number of estimations in which we additionally include other measures. Table 11 in Appendix E shows the results of the simplest MNL model with different other performance measures. Tests for the more involved NMNL models give similar pictures. Model (1) is the MNL model contained in Table 3 , which has been discussed in Section 4.2. In Models (2) through (4) we add other performance measures: total factor productivity, annual stock market return, and cash-flow-on-equity. Similar to return-on-assets (ROA), these measures are industry-adjusted in the sense that they measure the difference to median industry performance (two-digit industry level). Only stock market return is market-adjusted in the sense that it is corrected for the return of the DAFOX, the size-weighted return of all German stocks. The three new performance measures have missing values for some of the observations. Therefore, sample size decreases when controlling for these effects. For stock market return this is obvious because it can only be calculated for listed firms.
None of the additional coefficients are statistically different from zero, and a test of the hypothesis that they are jointly zero can not be rejected (for the test statistic, see last row). A comparison of the estimates of the other coefficients shows that they hardly change when a new performance variable is included. We infer from this robustness test that the performance variable ROA, which we include in all regressions, picks up all relevant information. So we are confident that its inclusion in the regressions suffices, and we ignore the other performance variables that would only lead to inefficient estimates if they do not contain any additional information.
We proceed the same way for different measures of financial pressure. The results of these estimates are shown in Table 12 . Only the current ratio, a measure of liquidity, has a weakly significant coefficient. But its influence is small, and the other parameters do not change qualitatively when the current ratio is included. But we loose roughly ten percent of observations due to missing information when the current ratio is included in the specification. This leads to inefficiencies and, if the firms we have to drop differ systematically from the remaining firms, additionally to sample selection bias. We therefore decide not to include this variable in our analysis. As argued before, this decision does not seem to influence our main findings.
Finally, firm-specific characteristics such as performance could be affected in the year when a change in control takes place. If this is the case, then our explanatory variables could systematically be different from their normal values, and hence should at least be questionable as determinants of an acquisition or a failure that takes place in the following year. To check whether our results are affected by this problem, we re-estimate Model (1) from Section 4.2 excluding firm-years in which a change in control takes place. We find essentially the same results. Only the second-order term of the Herfindahl index looses its significance, and the pyramid dummy becomes significantly negative at the five-percent level. These and more results of sensitivity checks can be requested from the authors.
Conclusions
The intent of this study is to provide a better understanding of the dynamics of corporate ownership and firm survival in Germany. In particular, we consider the role of different types of shareholders as sellers and buyers of control blocks. The empirical analysis is based on a sample of over 1,300 medium-sized and large German firms for the years 1986-1995.
There are two major findings. First, poor performance and high financial pressure make firms more likely to fail and to experience a change in ownership. This latter finding contrasts with the widespread belief that acquisitions target well-performing firms to the detriment of shareholders and other stakeholders. Rather, our finding is consistent with the view that acquisitions can have a disciplining effect on poorly performing firms (Denis and Sarin, 1999; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2000) . Our second major finding is that both the type of seller and the type of buyer matter in transfers of corporate control. This implies that not taking into account different shareholder types in control transactions biases results of empirical studies. This is a classical omitted variables problem. Börsch-Supan and Köke (2000) discuss this and other common methodological problems in corporate governance studies in detail. To illustrate this, take the example of ownership concentration. We find that concentration reduces the likelihood of acquisition when we do not control for the type of seller. However, our analysis reveals that (1) this effect is not monotonous but non-linear in the degree of ownership concentration, and that (2) this non-linearity depends on whether a firm is initially under tight or under loose control of shareholders. More specifically, we find that for firms without a dominant owner the likelihood of an acquisition rises as concentration increases. This effect is consistent with Grossman and Hart (1980) who argue that free-riding of small shareholders increases the costs for a takeover. Vice versa, we find that for firms which do have a dominant owner the likelihood of an acquisition shrinks as concentration increases further. This effect is consistent with Holmström and Tirole (1993) who argue that takeovers require low concentration of ownership because the size of the free-floating fraction of shares is important to determine the necessity of an acquisition. In combination, both effects indicate that takeovers are the most likely for medium shareholder concentration, for example three or four shareholders holding equally sized fractions of shares. This stresses the importance of the concentration setting at the outset of negotiations over corporate control transactions. Burkart et al. (2000) provide important theoretical work in this direction.
The other findings of this study can be summarized as follows; we discuss some of these results in combination with the policy implications below. Irrespective of the type of the controlling shareholder, firms are more likely to fail and to experience a change in ownership when financial pressure is high and firm size is small. This is consistent with previous studies (see, e.g., Altman, 1968; Bethel et al., 1998; Zingales, 1998) . In contrast, complex ownership structures such as pyramids and cross-ownership reduce the likelihood of failure and control transfer. This is consistent with theoretical predictions (Bebchuk et al., 1998) . Concerning the type of seller, firms under control of a large private shareholder are more likely to sell firms when financial pressure increases, but corporate shareholders are not. This is consistent with evidence that corporate shareholders have access to internal capital markets (Lamont, 1997), and liquidity constraints on the side of large private shareholders. Regarding the buyers of control blocks, large firms are more likely to be sold to the public, and even more so to the government. Again, this is consistent with liquidity constraints for private owners. Interestingly, firms under control of crossowned shareholders are more likely to be sold to the public, a large private investor, or a large corporate investor. This indicates that, if complex ownership structures are dissolved, then this is done either by spreading shares widely, or by selling control blocks to the government or a private investor.
Our study also has some important policy implications. One is obvious: The market for corporate control in Germany should be promoted, since typically poorly performing firms are acquired. Certainly an important step in that direction is the abolition of taxes on sales of large share blocks in other companies, which comes into effect in the year 2002. Second, we find that control transfers are less likely when firms are part of a pyramid or are ultimately controlled by a cross-owned shareholder. This result implies that complex ownership structures can impede changes in corporate control, which otherwise could address inefficiencies in firms' operations. From a policy perspective, this negative effect of cross-ownership and pyramid structures should be addressed. But the issue of complexity of ownership structures is not a problem specific to Germany. Many Continental European countries, which typically show higher concentration of ownership than the US or the UK, apply this anti-takeover device (Bebchuk et al., 1998; La Porta et al., 1999) . Thirdly, we find evidence that in particular private owners tend to sell their control blocks when the respective firm faces high financial pressure, even when we control for poor performance. This suggests that wealth constraints of private owners leads to higher control transfer activity. Irrespective whether control is transferred to more efficient owners or not, wealth constraints per se should not induce control sales. This implies that policy should aim to reduce these liquidity constraints of private firm owners.
As a last remark, an extension of our approach for studying transfers of control and firm failure could be of interest. The most obvious extension are estimates using even more flexible discrete choice models than the nested multinomial logit model. In particular, explicit panel data models such as panel probit or mixed logit models allow for some correlation of unobserved firm characteristics over time and thereby provide another robustness check of our findings. Another important step further would be to examine in a systematic fashion whether control transfers lead to more efficient corporate governance. Evidence on the US indicates that this is the case (Bethel et al., 1998) . Preliminary work for Germany also suggests that control transfers are followed by improvements in performance (Köke, 2000) . An econometric approach that jointly models the endogeneity of control transfers and firm performance could give further insights about the causal interdependence of these important variables. Finally, our approach to take into account differences between shareholder types could be extended in a similar fashion to model the effects different shareholder types have on corporate governance and efficiency. Evidence on this issue is particularly important as one group of shareholders, the institutional investors, is steadily gaining influence on corporate policy (see, e.g., Smith, 1996) .
A Data sources and sample selection
The starting point of data selection is Hoppenstedt's Balance Sheet Database (BSD) which contains information on a significant number of large listed and non-listed firms, both in the legal form of AG and GmbH. We take 1986 as the starting year because a change in disclosure rules hinders comparability of the annual reports before and after the year 1986.
2 The last year of our investigation is 1996 because our series of ownership data ends in this year. For the period 1986-1996, BSD contains 5,679 firms (31,294 firmyears) for which consolidated balance sheet data are available. We eliminate firms from the utility, traffic, and telecommunications industries because they were still predominantly government-owned during the period of observation. As a matter of comparability, we also eliminate firms which primarily operate in the banking and insurance business, while operating little in non-financial activities. In combination, selection by industry causes 1,928 firm deletions.
Data on ownership structures are obtained from annual reports published by former Hypobank. These reports contain ownership information on all listed German companies, but also on a range of large non-listed firms. Hypobank reports the size and the name of a direct owner when the size of the ownership block exceeds 5 percent. In very few cases smaller ownership blocks are also included. However, ownership information from Hypobank cannot readily be used in our analysis for three reasons. First, ownership information from Hypobank only refers to the direct level of owners. But the present analysis requires to identify the ultimate owner of each sample firm (see Appendix B). Second, Hypobank does not directly reveal ownership information on medium-sized non-listed firms. Other commercial data sources are also of little help because during our period of observation, non-listed firms generally have not been subject to strictly enforced disclosure requirements. Therefore, we construct the relevant ownership structures by searching the information on investments in subsidiaries and affiliated companies which is given in the appendix to each company in Hypobank. In addition, we searched the Mannheim Company Database (MUP) located at the ZEW in Mannheim. Thereby we obtain ownership structures on many medium-sized non-listed firms, mainly in the legal form of private companies with limited liability (GmbH). Third, we tracked all sample firms through the years 1986-1996 to obtain a panel on ownership structures, merging firm-years on the basis of the name of each company. A problem was that some firms in our sample changed their names during the period of observation, for example following takeovers or restructuring of conglomerates. Since changes in ownership are crucial to the data collection procedure, we searched Hypobank and MUP for information on changes in names as well as takeovers.
Furthermore, we drop firms with less than two consecutive years for which ownership information is available because our analysis requires to calculate changes in ownership (2,216 firm deletions). Since our analysis focuses on the year prior to the year in which a change in ownership or firm failure occurs, we exclude firm-years for which no ownership data in the following year are available. For most firms this is the year 1996, the final year of the sample. Finally, 25 firms must be eliminated due to missing values on the variables used in the empirical analysis. This selection procedure leaves 1,510 firms (7,577 firm-years) for the years 1986-1995. Table 6 summarizes the selection procedure. 
B Concept of control
Large German companies typically show complex ownership structures such as pyramids with several layers of ownership and cross-ownership between firms (La Porta et al. 1999 , Böhmer 2000 , Köke 2001 . Hence, analysis of direct ownership is not sufficient. It is important to determine which shareholder ultimately controls a firm (ultimate ownership). This requires considering the ownership structure of direct shareholders as well as a criterion that establishes whether a shareholder is controlled by another shareholder, i.e. whether to extend the analysis to the next level in the ownership structure. In essence, for each shareholder in any control chain it needs to be established whether there is a controlling owner or not.
The ultimate owner is identified for each firm in two steps. First, we identify the ultimate owner of each direct shareholder using the following rules: Starting from the direct level (level 1), we proceed to the next level (level 2) in the ownership structure if the largest shareholder on level 2 owns 50 percent or more of the shares. If this criterion is not met, the largest shareholder must own 25 percent or more of the shares, with all other shareholders owning less than 25 percent. In case where both criteria are not met, our stop rule applies and we do not pursue the respective ownership chain further. These rules guarantee that no more than one ultimate owner is identified for each direct shareholder. Note that if a shareholder has split his ownership stake in a particular company into several smaller stakes, for example into two blocks of 50 percent held by two subsidiary firms, we combine these smaller stakes into one single block. We set the first cut-off point at 50 percent because German law allows an investor owning 50 percent or more of all company shares to appoint management.
3 The second cut-off point is set at 25 percent because an investor owning 25 percent of the shares in a company has the right to veto decisions. In a second step in determining the ultimate owner, we apply both rules to all direct shareholders. This allows us to identify one single shareholder that is in ultimate control of each sample firm. When no single shareholder fulfills the criteria of our concept of control, this company is seen to have no ultimate owner.
C Sample characteristics
The sample comprises mainly listed and non-listed large German firms. Additionally, it also includes a significant number of medium-sized firms. Taking the year 1992 as an example, Table 7 shows that listed firms are well-covered (68.9 percent of all listed firms). In fact, the data base includes almost all firms listed on any German stock exchange, excluding firms in the financial service industries and firms under strict government regulation such as utility, traffic, and telecommunications (see Appendix A). Table 7 also shows that approximately half of the sample firms are not listed. These firms are run under three different legal forms: public companies with limited liability (AG and, to a much smaller extent, KGaA), and private companies with limited liability (GmbH). Coverage of non-listed firms is much weaker, in particular for GmbH firms (0.03 percent of all GmbH firms). This is mainly due to the immense number of GmbH firms in Germany. Controlling for firm size, we find that the sample contains about 48 percent of all public companies with limited liability and minimum sales of 100 million DM, listed as well as non-listed. More than 3 percent of private companies with limited liability and minimum sales of 100 million DM are included. Hence, the sample is representative for large listed and non-listed public companies with limited liability, but much less so for GmbH firms.
D Definition of variables
The variables used in this study are defined as follows (Table 8) Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses. Constants are included but not reported. **, *, +: significantly different from zero at the 1, 5, 10-% level, respectively. 
